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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are ambivalent about privacy.
On the one hand, we believe in self-creation, and cherish the
private space required to plot, plant and nurture our dreams. We
recoil at intrusions into that space, whether by government, busi-
ness, the media or our neighbors. On the other hand, we believe
in enlightened progress through competition, science, technology,
the market and ideas. No hypothesis goes untested, a process pow-
ered by mind probing beneath every surface, behind every truism,
past every "Keep Out" sign, driven by the quest for progressive,
pragmatic, ever-changing truths.
The law reflects this ambivalence. A property law regime pro-
tects the personal identity paradigm inherent in the garden meta-
phor for self-creation. The space we own is ours and may not be
entered without consent. At the same time, a free market and free
t Eric Jorstad is a partner in the law firm of Faegre & Benson LLP. He co-
ordinates the firm's Data Privacy practice. He wishes to thank John Borger, Kate
Boschee, Michael Carlson, Tom Schroeder, Nan Remus, Ann Kraemer, Jonathan
Asner, Kristin Eads and Paul Civello for reviewing earlier drafts of this article; for
better or worse, however, he is responsible for what is written here.
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speech regime protects the dynamic personal capacities paradigm
inherent in the progressive metaphor for competitive transforma-
tion. The powers of inquiry should not be thwarted by out-moded
barriers and no question, no comment, no product, is out of
bounds.
The Internet brings this conflict to a head.
The current debates about privacy should be understood in
the context of our underlying ambivalence, what I call the privacy
paradox. We have fashioned, to date, a legal and cultural system
which permits both paradigms to flourish (usually). At the dawn of
the Cyber Age, however, there are proposals to lop off one side or
the other of our core values. The secret of our success has been
the ability to maintain both sides of the paradox simultaneously.
The challenge now is to refashion legal norms to restructure our
vibrant ambivalence, our gloriously conflicted self-understanding,
for the New Age.
In this article, I will explore the privacy paradox as businesses,
government and American culture grapple with the appropriate
scope and limit for the regulation of data privacy in the Cyber Age.
In Part II, the core fear underlying the privacy debates is described
as loss of autonomy. Intrusions on (data) privacy by business, gov-
ernment and individuals are feared with respect to "big brother"
Internet, harassment, children, medical records, credit history, and
loss of face. The core fear is placed alongside the other core value
in the privacy debates, the free flow of information in the political
and economic spheres. In Part III, the developing regulatory re-
gime governing data privacy is described, looking at the process of
regulatory development through an analogy to the development of
the product safety regulatory regime. "Data" are, in one sense,
simply another type of product in the stream of commerce.1 Fi-
nally, in Part IV, I propose a model for organizations (business,
nonprofit and governmental) to move beyond privacy "compli-
ance" to the flexible integration of the privacy paradox into fun-
damental organizational mission. Ultimately, it is the unresolvable
nature of the privacy paradox which gives the issue of privacy its
dynamic power to catalyze organizational processes. As the phi-
losopher Friederich Nietzsche wrote, "One is fruitful only at the
cost of being rich in contradictions."' In short: embrace the privacy
1. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (stating that personal information
may be a "thin [g] in interstate commerce") (alteration in original).
2. FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight Of The Idols Or How To Philosophize With A
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paradox.
II. PRIVACY FEARS
Although the definition of the word, "privacy," is primarily
negative or exclusive, the concept of "privacy" includes both a posi-
tive and a negative dimension. According to Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary, privacy is defined as: "(1)(a) the quality or
state of being apart from company or observation: seclusion; (b)
freedom from unauthorized intrusion <one's right to privacy>; (2)
... a place of seclusion; (3)(a) secrecy; (b) a private matter: se-
crecy."' This definition emphasizes the negative notion of privacy,
that it is a state of not being visible to others, where one is not in-
truded upon. As the poet Robert Browning wrote,
I give the fight up: let there be an end,
A privacy, an obscure nook for me.
I want to be forgotten even by God.4
Privacy is the state of being safe behind a wall which excludes
others.
But there is a positive dimension implicit in this definition.
Privacy includes the power to build and maintain that wall of safety.
Privacy includes the power to set a boundary protecting the self-
and whatever or whomever else the self chooses to include-from all
others. Thus, a core value inherent in the concept of privacy is
autonomy or, to use a political term, freedom. Privacy is the freedom
to define and express one's self as one chooses. Whom do you wel-
come in your kitchen? In your bedroom? In the "c:\" drive of your
computer? The power to welcome as one chooses, and to exclude
as one chooses, is the positive dimension of privacy.
In this light, we can see what motivates the current debates
over privacy, and understand why these debates are so highly
charged. With the growth of cyberspace and increased awareness
of the mobility of personally identifiable data ("PID"), the core fear
is loss of autonomy. In the "hierarchy of needs" identified by psy-
chologist Abraham Maslow, the most basic need is to not die, with
fear of death, then, being the primal fear. The next most basic
Hammer, in TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS/THE ANTI-CHRIST 54 (R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (emphasis omitted).
3. MERRAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 927 (10th ed. 1993), at
http://www.m-w.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2000).
4. ROBERT BROWNING, Paracelsus, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT BROWN-
ING 40, 44 (G. Robert Strange ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974) (1895).
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need, closely related, is for safety, the need to not be harmed. In
Maslow's approach, the higher order needs-for love, productivity,
meaning, art and spirituality-cannot be met unless the primal
needs are first secured.5 Privacy is an element of the nearly-most
primal need for safety,6 and may even involve fundamental life-and-
death fears.7
This hits home for me with a simple metaphor. I have two
daughters, currently ages eleven and fifteen. I often feel that sit-
ting them down, alone, at a personal computer connected to the
Internet is the cyberspace equivalent of setting them down by
themselves in the middle of Times Square in New York City. What
can they see? Who can see them? How can they evaluate the mo-
tives of everyone who might approach them? How will they find
the fun, safe places that make Times Square a delight? Or will they
unwittingly fall prey to ... what? Do I even know what I should
really be afraid of, on their behalf?
Privacy fears take many forms in cyberspace.
One privacy fear is the power of "big brother" Internet. For
example, in 1998 GeoCities settled a suit brought by the FTC alleg-
ing that GeoCities was collecting extensive PID from Web site visi-
tors without the visitors' knowledge. GeoCities was collecting such
information as e-mail and postal addresses, gender, interest areas,
marital status, income, occupation and education. It collected this
from children as well as adults. The privacy fear is that Web sites
can function like "big brother" in Orwell's work of "fiction," 1984,
seeing all, hearing all, knowing all, and then making decisions af-
fecting the quality of your life without your knowledge or consent,
5. See generally ABRAHAM MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (3d ed.
1987).
6. According to neuroscientists, the need for safety arises from the most
primitive "reptilian" brain inside our skulls, the limbic system at the base of the
brain where it meets the spinal cord. This primitive brain asks only six questions
of any particular person encountered: whether this is someone to "1) nurture, 2)
be nurtured by, 3) have sex with, 4) run away from, 5) submit to, or 6) attack." H.
HENDRIX, GETTING THE LOvEYou WANT 11 (1998) (citing P. McLean, Man and His
Animal Brains, MOD. MED., Feb. 1964). The higher brain, like the higher order
needs described by Maslow, rests atop this primitive foundation.
7. The issue of abortion is often cast as a matter of privacy or autonomy. See
generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
The intensity of feeling and fears related to abortion, on all sides of the public de-
bate, illustrates the kind of response often connected to "privacy" issues.
8. In re GeoCities, FTC File No. 982 3015 (Aug. 13, 1998). Copies of the
complaint and the proposed consent order can be found at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/1998/9808.
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let alone participation. Web users may not make the distinction
critical to Orwell's vision, between the omniscient totalitarian "eye"
of the government and of businesses. It is simply "another" who is
watching me, invading my privacy. The core fear is loss of auton-
omy.
Another privacy fear is personal harassment. Stories of Inter-
net "stalking" are common, or at least felt to be common. One re-
port illustrates the concern. A direct marketing company con-
tracted with the Texas prison system for inmates to enter survey
data into computers. One inmate, a sex offender, used informa-
tion from the data entry to write a twelve-page threatening letter to
a woman who had responded to the company's survey. Because of
this case, the Texas legislature barred sex offenders from record-
entry work. "We lost some damn good programmers-pedophiles,"
said the director of state prison industries. "Some of our best com-
puter operatives were sex offenders."9
A related privacy fear is identity theft. Trans Union, one of the
Big Three credit reporting agencies, noted that its credit bureau
received more than 45,000 calls a month from people complaining
that their credit accounts had been taken over. This fear is not
limited to cyberspace. My own credit card was stolen and used to
purchase more than $1200 in clothing and electronics in one eve-
ning." More people are now buying paper shredders for their per-
sonal mail, shredding the voluminous credit card offers received by
mail which often contain PID. In the cyberworld, we are less confi-
dent of our ability to "shred" revealing electronic information
about us.
Medical information may be particularly sensitive. Last year,
University of Michigan medical records were posted on the Inter-
net for at least two months before the error was discovered.
12
9. Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: Privacy Devalued in Information Economy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1997, at Al.
10. Id.
11. My experience showed the value of legal protections for credit card hold-
ers. I was not aware that the card was even missing (I had left it behind at a su-
permarket), until the credit card company called the next morning because of
.suspicious" purchases which it wanted to verify were authorized. Local police ac-
tively investigated and apprehended the thief based on a store video camera which
captured a purchase at the exact time and location noted on the credit card re-
cords. The credit card company even waived my payment of the standard $50 de-
ductible for theft protection, so I ended up losing nothing in the end (except
some peace of mind).
12. Jodi Upton, U-M Medical Records End Up on Web, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 12,
2001] 1507
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Targeted direct mailing raises the question for consumers:
how much do "they" really know about me? I recently received a
direct mail political advertisement from a candidate promising to
keep our private information private ... addressed to me, person-
ally, at my home address. How did he know I lived there? How
much personal information is for sale? Who will target us, for
what?
A skeptic might ask, reasonably, how much of our privacy fear
reflected in these anecdotes is grounded in fact. There is a striking
paucity of reliable information. 3  The FBI's Uniform Crime Re-
porting Program includes subcategories for counterfeiting, forgery,
credit card fraud, bad checks and hate crimes but no Internet-
specific reports. 4 The FTC will take consumer complaints about
Internet fraud, spam, identity theft, and anything else about which
one wishes to complain, but its enforcement activities are limited
and its publication of Internet privacy resources slim.1 Creating
good public policy about privacy under these circumstances is like
drafting anti-crime legislation based on what you read while waiting
in the supermarket checkout line.
There is more to the story. The privacy fears based on non-
consensual intrusion into personal (data) space represent only one
side of the privacy paradox. The other side of the paradox does
not grab headline attention in the same way, but it is equally critical
to understanding data privacy.
A free society requires the free flow of information. This is
true in both the political and economic spheres. The First
Amendment protects the rights of expression, underlying the proc-
1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 3915521.
13. A compendium of shockingly unreliable information either about, or
transmitted by, the Internet can be found at http://www.urbanmyths.com.
14. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Uniform Crime Reporting Program, at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2000).
15. The FTC's Web site contains a complaint form, which also contains links
to the FTC's identity theft report form and unsolicited commercial e-mail (spam)
report form. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Bureau of Consumer Protection Complaint
Form, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/complaint.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2000). The
FTC's Web site also describes its enforcement activities and publications related to
privacy. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Privacy Initiatives, at http://www.ftc.gov/
privacy/index.htmi (last updated Oct. 10, 2000). A leading critic of the FrC pri-
vacy initiatives is the Electronic Privacy Information Center, or EPIC. E.g., Elec-
tronic Privacy Center, Network Advertising Initiative: Principles Not Privacy, (July
2000), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/Internet/NAI_analysis.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2000); http://www.epic.org/privacy/Internet/EPIC-testimony-799.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2000).
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ess of democratic self-governance. 16 This applies to political ex-
pression, to be sure; 7 but it also applies to protect the capacity of
businesses to create target audiences for particular commercial so-
licitations." The Freedom of Information Act and numerous state-
law "government in the sunshine" acts create public access to gov-
ernment information and give citizens the information they need
to scrutinize the operations of government.' 9  In the political
sphere, information flows freely both directions, from the governed
to the government and from the government to the governed, at
least in principle.
In the economic sphere, the free flow of information is critical
to the flexibility and power of the market. Consider just one ex-
ample. A consumer may feel queasy about the full range of infor-
mation available to a credit reporting agency, which may document
every loan, bank account, criminal conviction, and asset one has
(and could even include reports of interviews with neighbors and
coworkers).20 But in a mobile, diverse and large community of po-
tential borrowers, who wants to rely on the personal knowledge of a
banker the next time one applies for a home loan, car loan, or
credit card? Credit makes the (economic) world go around, and in
this big world it could not function without credit reports.
Furthermore, the commercial capacity for profiling target
21market audiences is the flip side of the credit evaluation process.
In a free economy - where customers can choose what to purchase,
from whom, and where businesses can choose what to sell, to whom
16. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). See also Burt
Neuborne, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, 538 PLI/PAT 1273, 1275-81
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1760
(1995); Alexander Meiklejohn, Testimony On The Meaning of the First Amendment,
FIRST AMENDMENT CYBER-TRIB., at http://w3.trib.com/FACT/Ist.meikle.html (last
updated Oct. 21, 1997).
17. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 194 (1999).
18. U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. den. sub nom.; Competition Policy Inst. v. U.S. West, Inc., 120
S. Ct. 2215, 2217 (2000).
19. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 1998); Minne-
sota Government Data Practices Act, MINN. STAT. §13.01 (1997) amended by 2000
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 468 (H.F. 3501) (West).
20. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (1994).
21. For the FTC's report about Web site profiling of customers, see FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, Online Profiling Report (June 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/06/index.htm#13; Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling: A Report to
Congress (Part 2): Recommendations (July 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/
07/onlineprofiling.htm.
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-the exchange of information is critical to finding a mutual "fit" be-
tween customer and business so that a sale can be made. When it
comes to a small-town hardware store, you feel good getting a call
from the owner at home telling you about a new shipment of inno-• 22
vative products helpful to your farm, home, or business. But
"telemarketing" by impersonal behemoths or computer-generated
voices is hardly a feel-good enterprise. 3 Customer profiling is the
mass market's attempt to simulate the personal attention of a busi-
ness that is known, liked, and trusted.
The commercial privacy fear, corresponding to the individual
privacy fears discussed above, is loss of trust. To succeed, a business
needs to be seen as reliable and responsive. At a minimum, a busi-
ness does not want to get "caught" breaching the rules of privacy
expected by customers. At the other end of the spectrum, a busi-
ness wants to be known as a place customers can count on, a place
that cares about what customers think and handles their concerns
with respect. In some lines of business involving particularly sensi-
tive information-financial, medical, insurance, credit, etc.-the
24
trust relationship is critical to the business's existence and growth.
This is the dilemma for business: how to obtain and use the
most helpful information about customers and potential custom-
ers, and at the same time show respect for the walls customers have
constructed to keep business (among others) out. The simple,
small-town answer is to be invited inside for conversation. In the
mass markets defining most business today, however, this kind of
access is not available.
22. My grandfather ran the local hardware store in Kenyon, Minnesota
(population of 1150) for many years. The description above is not a hypothetical.
23. There are exceptions, based in part on the detail of information available
to telemarketers. One evening this year, just as I was talking with my older daugh-
ter about the exhibit I had seen a few days earlier at the Minneapolis Art Institute,
the phone rang and it was a telemarketing solicitation from the Art Institute! Was
it ESP, surveillance, luck, or good-targeted marketing information? I recalled en-
tering a contest during my visit to win a design consultation at the Art Institute,
which was the likely source of my (unlisted) phone number. Needless to say, I am
now a proud member of the Minneapolis Art Institute.
24. Another dimension of the commercial regulatory fear is the high cost of
litigation in the area, due in part to the legal uncertainties. See infra Part III. Be-
cause data privacy is so prominent on the current public radar screen, and be-
cause of the inherent sensitivities involved in "privacy," the high cost of litigation
also includes the loss of goodwill and trust. Commercial privacy fears are directly
connected to the business bottom line of earnings, as well as the social psychologi-
cal factors discussed above.
1510 [Vol. 27:3
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III. PRIVACY REGULATIONS
If autonomy and access-freedom as the power to set a wall
and freedom as the power to cross every wall-are the competing
core values at stake in the concept of privacy, what legal regime
should be developed to advance these values? Looking at the big-
ger picture in historical context, privacy regulation today is (with a
few important exceptions) about where consumer product safety
regulation was in about 1965. Indeed, the experience with the de-
velopment of consumer product safety regulations is helpful for
understanding the current climate for the regulation of privacy.25
The mass market for tangible consumer products "took off' in
the 1950s. Although the Industrial Revolution and rise of auto-
mated production had been growing for decades, the transforma-
tion from a custom-made to a mass-produced economy was not com-
plete until after the second world war. At the dawn of the
consumer product economy, the governing legal regime could be
summarized in the Latin motto, caveat emptor, "let the buyer be-
ware." But a regime appropriate to the custom-production econ-
omy, characterized by face-to-face interactions between maker and
buyer, proved inadequate to the anonymous fungible mass-market
"modern" system which came to reign.
In California (naturally), in a case involving power tools (of
course), the state supreme court espoused a new view of liability for
26harm to consumers from modern products. The older view, negli-
gence, required some showing of fault on the part of the manufac-
turer before a consumer could recover. The California court re-
placed the fault system with strict liability in tort. An injured
consumer could recover if the product was defective, without re-
gard to the fault, or lack of fault, on the part of the manufacturer
who made it. Thereafter, in federal and state legislatures, con-
sumer product safety regulations came to prescribe standards for
product manufacture, and agencies arose to monitor complaints
and enforce compliance with the new standards. Industry groups
25. The impetus for this analogy was a line from Marc Rotenberg, Director of
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, while testifying at the FTC hearings on
electronic consumer privacy in 1996. He stated, "[p]rivacy will be to the informa-
tion economy what consumer protection and product safety were to the industrial
age." Bernstein, supra note 9, at Al. The development and critique of this analogy
in this article is, however, my own creation.
26. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963)
(embracing the concept of strict liability in a tort case involving a power tool).
2001]
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and trade associations often developed safety standards in conjunc-
tion with governmental efforts.
The laissez-faire regime of product safety was replaced by the
regulated market we take for granted today. One advantage of the
commonplace nature of these regulations is that a business may
procure insurance for its liability risks. The transaction costs for
the regulated market are enormous (insurance premiums, legal
departments, compliance officers, training, tax-funded agencies,
etc.), but the costs are for the most part predictable. Consumer
product safety is just one of the costs of doing business, like labor,
equipment and advertising.
The world of data privacy regulation today is much like the
world of consumer product safety regulation in the mid-1960s. Just
as the universalization of automation replaced a custom-made con-
sumer product world with a mass-produced world, the universaliza-
tion of electronic data storage and communication is replacing the
custom-made consumer information databases with mass-produced
and mass-distributed information. The market for information
"took off" in the 1990s. It is epitomized by the commercialization
of cyberspace. At the dawn of the cyber-economy, the governing
legal regime can be described by a variant on the old Latin phrase:
caveat orator, "let the communicator beware." In other words,
communicate about yourself at your own risk. The communicator
bears the risk that the information communicated will be misused
somewhere in cyberspace-that one's survey results will be entered
in a computer by a convicted sex offender in Texas, that one's pur-
chasing patterns will be sold to telemarketers, that one's credit
identity will be misappropriated by someone else's wild spending
spree, that one's children will be stalked by Internet pedophiles,
and so on.
This "wild west" mentality of free-wheeling Internet data ex-
change is being faced with a stagecoach full of sheriffs eager to
clean up (or at least be seen cleaning up) the town. Data privacy
regulations are proliferating. The patchwork nature of the law is
breathtaking. Businesses struggling to meet even minimum goals
of compliance with data privacy laws are faced with complex inter-
nal data practices audits and development of new compliance
strategies-but to comply with ... what? What was/is/will be the
data privacy law? What will be the contours of the regulated data
privacy market which will, ineluctably, replace the caveat orator
world of the late 1990s?
1512 [Vol. 27:3
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Before turning to a brief outline of current data privacy laws, I
would like to make three overall comments.
First, the First Amendment changes the parameters of the
regulation of data privacy, in contrast to the now well-settled regu-
lation of consumer product safety. The collection, organization,
maintenance and dissemination of "information" is, after all, a
form of communication, and the First Amendment places distinct
and unique limits on the ability of the government to regulate
communication."
Second, the cyberworld of information distribution differs sig-
nificantly from the geoworld of consumer product distribution.
Consumer products "exist" in a world of atoms and molecules and
manufacturing plants (in a definable place) and sellers (in a defin-
able place) and buyers. Cyber-information "exists" in a different
manner. To be sure, it does exist. But its regulation poses prob-
lems ofjurisdiction, choice of law, regulatory authority and interna-
tional cooperation that are different from the regulation of tangi-
ble consumer products."'
Third, the dynamic power of the privacy paradox makes the
regulation of privacy particularly problematic. I will discuss this in
more detail in Part IV below. Indeed, I will ask whether it is possi-
ble-and desirable-to develop a regulatory scheme for data pri-
vacy along the model of consumer product safety regulation, in
light of the critical issues posed by the First Amendment, cyberju-
risdiction, and the privacy paradox.
With these historical and philosophical principles in mind, we
can sketch the current law of data privacy with broad brush strokes.
There are five areas in which data privacy is regulated: federal stat-
utes and regulations, state statutes and regulations, state common
27. E.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000).
28. E.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (involving personal jurisdiction over the California operator of an Internet
site that provided information on a forthcoming service); State by Humphrey v.
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (involving personal jurisdiction over Nevada operator of
forthcoming online gambling service advertised to Minnesota residents); see also
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(holding that Massachusetts corporation purposefully availed itself of privilege of
doing business in Connecticut by advertising its activities and its toll-free number
on Internet on a continuing basis); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding "likelihood that personal jurisdic-
tion can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet").
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law, the European Union, and self-regulation.
A. Federal Statutes And Regulations
The main federal statutes governing data privacy have been
developed to address specific sub-areas of privacy, according to the
kind of data at issue. The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") gov-
erns credit reporting agencies and certain employment-related
data. 9 The new Financial Services Modernization Act, or Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, governs data practices of "financial institutions,"
broadly defined. 0 The Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act governs data use by health care institutions.
In addition to these broad laws governing certain categories of
data, other federal statutes regulate data based on the age of the
data subject, type of data recipient, or means of data collection.
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act governs Web site col-
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-u (1994 & Supp. 1998). The FTC has published
formal commentary on the FCRA. See Federal Trade Commission, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcrajump.htm (last updated Oct.
17, 2000), as well as extensive letter opinions concerning specific FCRA issues, at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/index.htm (last updated Aug. 22, 2000) and
guidelines for compliance, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/2-fedreg.htm.
30. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 ("FSMA"), Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15
U.S.C.). The FTC published its final rule implementing the FSMA on May 24,
2000, with full compliance required by July 1, 2001. Privacy of Consumer Finan-
cial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33, 677 (May 24, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R.
pt. 313). See also Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693, 1693a-r (1994 &
Supp. 1998) (establishing rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in
electronic fund transfer systems for the provision of individual consumer rights);
Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1666aj (1994 & Supp. 1998) (establish-
ing a consumer's rights and a creditor's duties in resolving alleged errors in an
open-end credit (e.g. credit card) account and applying generally to disputes
about goods or services that are not accepted or delivered as agreed, but not cov-
ering disputes relating to quality of goods or services a consumer accepts); Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3420, 3422 (1994 & Supp.
1998) (specifying what a bank must receive before it can release customer infor-
mation to a federal agency; this applies to disclosure of financial records and re-
sponse to customer authorization, administrative summons, subpoenas, search
warrants, formal written requests or judicial subpoenas. Contrary to the Act's tide,
it does not establish a general right of financial privacy); Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (criminalizing hacking if
hackers gain unauthorized access to computer systems, whether they intend to
damage the system or not).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e (Supp. 1998). For the complete Act, see Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
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lection and use of data from children age thirteen and under.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act governs the means of
turning over information from electronic databases to law en-
forcement agencies. 33 Federal anti-eavesdropping and wiretapping
laws prohibit the third-party interception of electronic communica-
tions, except under very limited circumstances. 4
The statutes creating and defining certain federal agencies
have been interpreted by those agencies to create jurisdiction over
data privacy regulation. The Federal Trade Commission has been
particularly active with respect to domestic data privacy matters,
and the Department of Commerce has been active with respect to
35international data privacy matters.
Previous federal efforts to regulate the content of Internet
communications, particularly with respect to indecent or offensive
speech, have been invalidated under the First Amendment. 6
B. State Statutes And Regulations
It is beyond the scope of this article to delineate the full pano-
ply of state statutes and regulations governing data privacy.37 Rele-
38vant state statutes may include a deceptive trade practices act,
electronic eavesdropping act, 9 anti-harassment and/or anti-
stalking act, and industry-specific statutes covering data practices in
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (Supp. 1998).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2513, 2515-2522 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
34. Id.
35. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57, 57a-c, 58 (1994 &
Supp. 1998).
36. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 163 (3d Cir. 2000).
Restrictions on obscene speech have been upheld under criminal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
37. I asked an associate in our firm to go through just the Minnesota statutes
to determine every law which addresses data privacy. She dropped on my desk two
large binders of laws, all in addition to the data privacy laws catalogued by the Revi-
sor of Statutes at MINN. STAT. § 13.99 (1998). Unlike the law of product liability,
such as Products Liability by Louis R. Frumer and Melvin I. Friedman, there is no
single reporter or looseleaf service yet compiling and organizing the law of data
privacy for the fifty states, or even at the federal level. Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN
I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCrS LIABILITY (Supp. 2000).
38. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966), enacted in Minnesota at MINN. STAT. §§
325D.43-325D.48 (1998).
39. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Can We Tape?: A Prac-
tical Guide to Taping Phone Calls and In-Person Conversations in the 50 States and D. C.,
at http://www.rcfp.org/taping/index.html.
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insurance, health care, banking, human relations departments, and
elsewhere. °
States also attempt to regulate the content of Internet com-
munications, but similarly run afoul of the First Amendment4' or
42
the dormant Commerce Clause.
C. State Common Law
Most of the fifty states recognize some part of the common law
of privacy.43 The high court of the most recent state to recognize
invasion of privacy torts, Minnesota, described the privacy interest
protected by the common law:
Today we join the majority of jurisdictions and recognize
the tort of invasion of privacy. The right to privacy is an
integral part of our humanity; one has a public persona,
exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and
preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which
parts of our lives shall become public and which parts we
shall hold close.
Here [plaintiffs] Lake and Weber allege in their com-
plaint that a photograph of their nude bodies has been
publicized. One's naked body is a very private part of
one's person and generally known to others only by
choice. This is a type of privacy interest worthy of protec-
tion. Therefore, without consideration of the merits of
Lake and Weber's claims, we recognize the torts of intru-
sion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of
private facts.44
It is an oversimplification to describe "invasion of privacy" as
one tort. In actuality, "invasion of privacy" has been employed as
the general rubric to subsume four separate privacy torts: (a) intru-
sion upon seclusion; (b) misappropriation; (c) publication of pri-
vate facts; and (d) false light publicity.4a The first and third of these
40. Lawyers, of all people, should be sensitive to data privacy issues, in that
lawyers routinely work with confidential client information, under strict ethical
and evidentiary rules limiting (or requiring) disclosure. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (amended 1998).
41. State v. Weidner, 611 N.W.2d 684, 694 (Wis. 2000).
42. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
43. Eric Jorstad & John Borger, Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota's New Torts, 55
MINN. BENCH & B. 38, 38-41 (Oct. 1998); BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY §
11.2.1, at 525 & n.4 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
44. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
45. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652 (B)-(E) (1976).
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torts are particularly apt to be applied to data privacy, as it has been
discussed in this article. Although tortious intrusion upon seclu-
sion developed in the geo-world context of physical intrusion upon
physical seclusion, it may be applied to intrusion upon data seclu-
sion in the cyberworld where one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the data and the other essential elements of the tort are
46met. Similarly, tortious publication of private facts may be espe-
cially appropriate in the context of the Internet, where everyone
with a computer and a modem may be a "publisher" of erstwhile
private data to the entire cyberworld .
Where the information published in cyberspace is false (not
true, as presupposed for the above variants of tortious invasion of
privacy), there may also be a remedy in the state common law of
defamation. s
D. European Union
In the late 1990s, the European Union took the initiative to
regulate the creation, maintenance and transborder transmission
of data involving European data subjects with the adoption of the• • • 49
Data Privacy Directive. The Directive regulates the free move-
ment of data containing personal information. After considerable
diplomatic and commercial consternation about differences be-
tween the Directive and data privacy practices in the United States
-and the impact of those differences on trans-national businesses-
the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Union
agreed to "Safe Harbor" provisions which now effectively govern
the European data practices of U.S. enterprises.
5
0
There are seven basic principles to the European Union Data
Privacy Directive, as implemented for U.S. businesses through the
Safe Harbor provisions:
-notice to data subjects of data practices;
-choice by data subjects to opt-out of those practices;
,onward transfer of data consistent with described practices;
46. See EricJorstad, Invasion of Privacy in Minnesota (Jan. 1999), at http://
www.faegre.com/articles/article-208.asp.htm.
47. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (2000); cf David
Phelps, Judge Limits Salary Data in Web Case, STAR TRIB., Mar. 29, 2000, at ID, avail-
able at 2000 WL 6966479 (posting certain sensitive information permitted).
48. Eric Jorstad, Online Business Defamation: How to Respond to "Cybersmearing"
(July 2000), at http://www.faegre.com/articles/article_414.asp.
49. Data Privacy Directive, 95/46 EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
50. Dep't of Commerce, SafeHarbor, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor.
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-security of data protected by prescribed protocols;
integ7ity of data use consistent with the purposes for which
data were collected;
,access to personally-identifiable data, with the opportunity to
correct it; and
-enforcement through national administrative agencies. 5'
These principles may come to guide general data privacy prac-
tices in the United States, although there is hot debate concerning
the nature of access, the kind of choice, whether notice should be
mandatory, the adequacy of various security measures, and federal
agency versus state agency versus judicial enforcement of alleged
52privacy violations.
E. Self-Regulation
Pre-existent industry and trade associations have taken a keen
interest in data privacy regulation, and various ad hoc groups have
formed to create voluntary guidelines and certifications. The Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners, for example, has
published model statutes concerning privacy of insurance, health,
financial and other personal information.5 3 The Online Privacy Al-
liance is an organization of cyber-companies determined to de-
velop voluntary privacy compliance principles and to stave off gov-
ernmental privacy regulation. 54 The Individual Reference Service
Group ("IRSG") is an association of data research companies which
provide information-for a fee-investigating individual or business
assets, location, criminal history, judgments, UCC filings, and so
on. The IRSG has developed an extensive and detailed set of vol-
untary privacy principles for its members' compliance, together
with a system of independent third-party certification (like an au-
dit) of compliance.5 5 The Better Business Bureau has developed an
online version of its consumer-friendly voluntary reporting system;56
51. Id.
52. Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives, Final Report of the Federal
Trade Commission Advisory Committee on Online Access and Security (May 15, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/finalreport.htm.
53. See Health Information Privacy Model Act (1998), Privacy of Consumer
Financial and Health Information Regulation (2000), and Insurance Information
and Privacy Protection Model Act (1980), at http://www.naic.org/lpapers.
54. http://www.privacyalliance.org.
55. Individual Reference Service Group, Industry Principles (Dec. 1997), at
http://www.irsg.org/html/industry_principles-principles.htm.
56. http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/index.asp.
1518 [Vol. 27:3
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/16
THE PRIVACY PARADOX
and the "TrustE" certification logo has appeared on many Web sites
indicating participation in that organization's voluntary data pri-
vacy program.
IV. PRESERVING THE PRIVACY PARADOX IN PRACTICE
Watching the sheriffs come swaggering into cybertown, it is
tempting to adopt the view of Henry David Thoreau who once
wrote, "If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house
with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my
life." 57 Thoreau's worldview is also tempting in his attempt to cre-
ate "Walden Pond," a utopian community set apart from commer-
cial culture. That is an extreme answer to privacy fears, however, in
the age of caveat orator. There is always one solution to the fear of
misuse of one's personal information: stop communicating with
others. Create your own "Walden Pond" retreat.
At the other extreme, cyber dreamers envision a united, wired
world of free and universal communication, an electronic utopia
that welcomes everyone in a new Republic of Silicon. Our lan-
guage encourages this vision, expressed most powerfully in the
metaphor driving the Cyber Age: "World Wide Web." We are uni-
fied in the emerging multicultural, transnational, democratic, in-
terconnected, synergistic web metaphysic. Reasonable skeptics
(and unreasonable conspiracy theorists) may note that the heart of
the metaphor, "web," necessarily includes a spider who does the
weaving and whose goals are neither aesthetic nor altruistic. We
are united in a single reality by the web: we are prey.
Most of us inhabit the space on the continuum between the
utopian/paranoid retreatists and the utopian/paranoid ecumeni-
cists. The extremes illustrate the conflicting tendencies facing
businesses and policy makers trying to address privacy concerns re-
sponsibly. How can we develop reasonable privacy policies which
provide both safety and free communication?
Trying to craft privacy policy in these transformative times is
like trying to write ajazz mass in Latin. It can be done. But there is
something fundamentally grating, some basic, clashing cultural and
linguistic forms that don't (yet) feel like they belong together. For
lawyers, this clash is particularly awkward, because legal norms de-
velop and mature at a slower pace than business and cultural
57. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 70 (B.
Atkinson ed., 1937).
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norms. Some courts are starting to "get" the Internet, and what it
means for jurisdiction, the First Amendment, and the like. But
judges still wear robes, after all. Most courts still don't even allow
cameras in the courtroom. Having resisted the video age, and pre-
siding amidst the trappings of eighteenth century England, courts
are not at the leading edge of the regulation of the caveat orator cy-
ber world. Lawyers habituated to the judicial culture are also ill-
equipped to structure privacy policy in the new Age.
But there is something important lawyers can preserve and,
ideally, adapt for the cyber world. Good lawyers have good judg-
ment, with flexibility to apply basic norms in changing contexts and
to predict what courts will, eventually, do. It is precisely that kind
of leadership which is needed to create workable privacy policies.
It is impossible to prescribe one "privacy program" to guide
privacy policy development in every situation. Nevertheless, certain
factors and dynamics may be helpful to identify. My audience is
particular entities, be they business or nonprofit, with some side
glances toward governmental legislators and regulators. I propose
a three-part privacy policy paradigm to structure the privacy proc-
ess: integrity, participation and challenge. This is an ongoingprocess that builds in the dynamic tension of the privacy paradox.
A. Integrity
As recent lawsuits attest, perhaps the most important part of
any organization's privacy policy is to "practice what you preach.
59
State Attorney Generals and federal regulators scrutinize the pri-
vacy practices of organizations under consumer, charitable, and
other fraud standards, to ensure that the practices comport with
the stated privacy policies.
The issue for organizations, however, goes deeper than avoid-
ing embarrassing lawsuits and bad press. The prerequisite to integ-
rity is to know who you are and to know what you are doing. It may be
quite a challenge to meet these prerequisites, especially for large or
multi-faceted organizations. To understand the potential enormity,
ask this preliminary question: Where is data maintained within the
organization that might be subject to privacy concerns?
58. Or, if I modify the third part to read, "overhaul" instead of "challenge,"
we have a privacy policy acronym tailor-made for the dot-com world: IPO.
59. See, e.g., State of Minnesota v. Minn. Pub. Radio, No. C5-99-11388 (arising
out of the Minnesota Public Radio's donor list-sharing practices; settled August 4,
2000) (complaint on file with author); In re GeoCities, supra note 8.
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The thorough way to meet these prerequisites is to conduct a
data privacy inventory ("DPI"). The organization should know
every situation and place where any person or system in the organi-
zation collects, maintains, discloses or transmits PID. There should
be a map or flowchart showing the dynamics of collection, mainte-
nance and transmission of PID. This inventory should include:
-type of data;
source of data;
-purpose (s) for which data were collected;
-software format of database;
-physical location of database;
-security of data (firewalls, passwords, etc.);
-who has the ability/authority to enter data, access data,
transmit data in bulk, and/or transmit data as to one data subject-
and for what purposes;
-who provides and oversees that authority to enter, access
and/or transmit data; and
-how collection, maintenance, and disclosure of data are
documented.
In addition, the inventory should identify what vendors or ser-
vice providers have access to PID maintained by the organization;
then review all contracts with vendors and service providers for lev-
els of compliance currently required. Do these contracts include
non-disclosure provisions at least as strict as the organization's own
commitments to privacy? The inventory should identify all inter-
nal, affiliated, and non-affiliated third parties with which PID are
shared.
This is just the prerequisite to integrity. You cannot operate
with integrity unless you know, first, how you are in fact operating.
The next step is to understand how privacy is integrated with your
fundamental organizational mission. This depends on who you are
as an organization. Assuming the organization has a "mission
statement" or some equivalent, the goal is to analyze mission in
terms of privacy issues. A medical device manufacturer, for exam-
ple, may see its basic mission, in part, in terms of patient and physi-
cian trust in both the scientific prowess and complete candor of the
company. It may want to take an extremely proactive approach to
privacy to be (and be seen as) a leader in privacy protection. A re-
tail company, on the other hand, which relies on mass marketing
tailored by every available piece of consumer data, may see its basic
mission, in part, in terms of expanding customer interest in its
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many products. It may want to work chiefly through trade associa-
tions to limit or influence governmental regulation of cross-
marketing and its use and acquisition of PID for targeted market-
ing, and be seen as valuing customer choice through complying
with industry-standard privacy policies. The analysis will be differ-
ent for every organization.
Once an organization knows what data it has, and knows how
its data privacy policies fit with its basic mission, the organization
can take the final step toward integrity: implement data use prac-
tices to ensure consistent compliance with privacy goals (and laws).
Implementation should be reviewed with the following matters
in mind, in addition to the simple question, are we doing what we
say we are doing?
-Know who is in charge of privacy policy.
-Formalize implementation controls and testing.
-Document all compliance procedures developed including
the rationale for the procedures.
-Assess whether training in privacy compliance is far-sighted,
practical and adequate for the future.
-Anticipate short and long term data, technology, product,
channel and geography plans of the organization, including future
acquisitions.
-Build into the privacy policies a "responsible flexibility" to be
able to adapt and change and respond as the market, technology,
laws, attitudes, etc., change. The goal is to maximum business
flexibility consistent with compliance.
-Integrate privacy policy into future organizational plans. How
does the privacy policy help to meet long-term organizational
goals? Brainstorm future markets and channels and relationships.
-Develop procedures to monitor law and media for needed ad-
justments.
-Consider an annual third-party independent certification (as
in a financial audit) that organizational practices comply with or-
ganizational procedures and all relevant law.
John Kennedy, as president-elect, spoke to the Massachusetts
legislature about the characteristics of leadership. He spoke of the
historical qualities of public service, but his comments are appro-
priate to any organization and apropos to decisions about privacy:
When at some future date the high court of history sits in
judgment on each one of us-recording whether in our
brief span of service we fulfilled our responsibilities to the
1522 [Vol. 27:3
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/16
THE PRIVACY PARADOX
state-our success or failure, in whatever office we may
hold, will be measured by the answers to four questions-
Were we truly men of courage? Were we truly men of
judgment? Were we truly men of integrity? Were we truly
men of dedication?60
Inspiring words. But of course integrity is not the only goal.
As the "Mayflower Madam" told the Boston Globe "I ran the wrong
kind of business, but I did it with integrity.
61
B. Participation
The second part of the privacy policy paradigm for particular
entities relates not to the goal, integrity, but to the process of work-
ing toward that goal. Because "privacy" has become a current "hot
button" issue, it is tempting simply to slap together a nice-sounding
privacy program, announce it to the world, hope one doesn't get
sued, and then move on to the next issue. But, as I have tried to
show in Part II of this article, the underlying issues run deeper than
today's hot topics. Integrity in privacy policies should go hand-in-
hand with integration of privacy concerns into the organization's
various processes and structures. The development and implemen-
tation of privacy policies should involve the participation of all af-
fected.
"Participation" requires an understanding of who should be
involved. During the course of conducting a data privacy inven-
tory, data subjects and data holders should be identified. In addition,
there are other possible constituents of the organization who may
have a stake in privacy policies. Certain processes should be con-
sidered in privacy policy development:
,understand the organizational culture with respect to privacy
issues;
research and understand customer privacy concerns, and be
able to show how the organization has responded appropriately;
-involve all organizational stakeholders, including investors,
prospective investors (or donors and prospective donors), commu-
nities, etc.;
-integrate legal and business considerations with respect to pri-
vacy;
60. SIMPSON'S QUOTATIONS, at http://www.bartleby.com/63/59/159.htmi
(citing N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1961).
61. SIMPSON'S QUOTATIONS, at http://www.bartleby.com/63/76/1876.html
(citing BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1986).
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-develop a detailed public relations plan for privacy;
-consider whether to develop an advocacy plan on privacy is-
sues before legislatures, state and federal regulators, and courts,
perhaps through a trade association; and
-know what competitors or counterparts are doing.
Organizational structure may be affected by this participatory
process. Someone "high up" in the organization should take the
lead in organizing and running the process, but the person or
group in charge at the beginning should be flexible to adapt as is-
sues develop. In some cases, a "Chief Privacy Officer" on the level
of a Chief Financial Officer or Chief Operating Officer may be ap-
pointed. In other cases, an ad hoc committee or task force may be
the best approach. In all cases, assertive leadership is needed along
with an openness to the genuine participation and concerns of all
affected by privacy issues.
C. Challenge
Because the privacy paradox is inherently unresolvable, no pri-
vacy policy will ever be adequate. It is impossible to provide com-
plete safety for individual autonomy and complete openness in the
exchange of information at the same time. The best an organiza-
tion can accomplish is to reach a balance appropriate for a given or-
ganizational structure, mission, data inventory, and political con-
text ... and then be ready to change.
In the Cyber Information Age ("CIA"), the value of data to an
organization will only increase over time. The possibilities for data
mining, data applications and data value enhancement are still only
emerging, as are information technologies. The global nature of
the nascent CIA not only increases the quantity of available data
and the number of potential markets, but also increases the volatil-
ity of data acquisition and use because there are so many different
actors involved with so many different agendas and bases of power
in so many jurisdictions. If an organization's privacy policy is not
already obsolete by the time it is implemented, then the organiza-
tion is out of touch with the CIA. Every privacy policy is temporary.
This complexity and volatility is compounded, in the United
States and other countries committed to free expression, by the
62. For example, in journalism there is an organization dedicated to the dis-
covery and use of cyberdata in reporting. See National Institute for Computer As-
sisted Reporting, at http://www.nicad.org.htm.
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protections for communication like those provided by the First
Amendment. Governmental restrictions on data use are problem-
atic. In this light, as well as in light of the global flow of informa-
tion technology and data, the kind of predictability achieved in the
regulated consumer product economy may elude the CIA. To be
sure, high-tech and database insurance products are already on the
market, and more can be expected. The Safe Harbor reached be-
tween the E.U. and U.S. shows the potential for global develop-
ment of some (possibly) effective data privacy regulatory principles.
But the privacy paradox cannot be avoided.
There will be calls to scale back First Amendment protections
in the name of protecting the safety of data subjects. There will be
calls to sacrifice the values of free communication for a safety "fix."
There will also be calls to get used to the surveillance society of lots
of big brothers and big sisters. There will be calls to sacrifice the
values of personal autonomy at stake in the ability to restrict access
to unwanted intrusions. And there will be calls to limit state or
even national jurisdiction over data use in order to develop effec-
tive international regulatory bodies or tribunals. The cyber sheriffs
are pretty good at what they do.
I would not pretend to predict the long-term effect of current
trends in the CIA or its erstwhile regulation. I can only note the
critical importance of both sides of the privacy paradox, the dyna-
mism of its inherent tension, and suggest possible effects of pro-
posals to lop off one side or the other.
This is why I call the third part of the privacy policy paradigm
challenge. As one newspaper editor said to a conference of col-
leagues: "Let there be a fresh breeze of new honesty, new idealism,
new integrity. You have typewriters, presses and a huge audience.
How about raising hell?" 6 Computers have replaced typewriters,
and the number of "presses" has multiplied with the speed of the
expansion of the Internet. But the advice is the same. A fresh
breeze is needed. In the CIA, the irony of privacy policy develop-
ment is that every policy and every regulation will always miscarry.
The only way that organizational integrity and participation can be
effective is to continually challenge organizational integrity and
participation. Ultimately, it is the unresolvable nature of the priv-
63. SIMPSON'S QUOTATIONS, at http://www.bartleby.com/63/32/8032.html
(citingJenkin Lloyd Jones, Editor, Tulsa Tribune, speaking to Inland Daily Press
Association, as reported in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 28, 1962).
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acy paradox which gives the issue its dynamic power to catalyze or-
ganizational processes.
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